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Abstract
Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) develop a bounded dominance test to make
robust welfare comparisons, which is intermediate between Ebert’s (1999) cardinal
dominance criterion –generalized Lorenz dominance applied to household incomes,
divided and weighted by an equivalence scale– and Bourguignon’s (1989) ordinal
dominance criterion. In this paper, we develop a more complete, but less robust
bounded index test, which is intermediate between Ebert’s (1997) cardinal index
test –an index applied to household incomes, divided and weighted by the equiv-
alence scale– and a (new) sequential index test –an index applied to household
incomes of the most needy only, the most and second most needy only, and so on.
We illustrate the power of our test to detect welfare changes in Russia using data
of the RLMS-surveys.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When income units are homogeneous in non-income characteristics, there exist many
tools to evaluate income distributions and the properties of these tools are well-known;
see Lambert (2001) for an overview. Basically, these tools can be classiﬁed in two groups.
Indices map income distributions into a comparable number measuring the welfare of
the distribution under consideration, whereas dominance criteria look for unanimity
among a “wide” class of such indices. The most well-known dominance criterion is the
generalized Lorenz dominance (GLD) criterion due to Shorrocks (1983). Unfortunately,
t h e s et o o l sa r en o tw e l l - s u i t e dt om a k er e a sonable comparisons in practice, because “At
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1the heart of any distributional analysis, there is the problem of allowing for diﬀerences
in people’s non-income characteristics” (Cowell and Mercader-Prats (1999)).
To make robust heterogeneous welfare comparisons, the most well-known result is Atkin-
son and Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) crite-
rion: (i) divide all income units into diﬀerent need types on the basis of non-income
characteristics and (ii) check –on the basis of the GLD criterion– whether the most
needy in one distribution dominate the most needy in another distribution, whether
the most and second most needy together in the former distribution also dominate the
most and second most needy in the other distribution, and so on. The SGLD criterion
is very robust –as it is equivalent to unanimity among a wide set of utilitarian welfare
orderings– but it has little power to rank distributions. It has been extended by Atkin-
son (1992), Jenkins and Lambert (1993), Chambaz and Maurin (1998), Lambert and
Ramos (2002), and Moyes (1999) to deal with changing demographics, poverty and/or
the principle of diminishing transfers. We also refer to Bourguignon (1989) for a related
dominance criterion.
The SGLD criterion is often called an “ordinal” dominance criterion, because the needs
c l a s s e sh a v et ob ed e ﬁned in an ordinal way only, i.e., a ranking of all non-income types
on the basis of needs. In contrast, practitioners often use equivalence scales to cardinalize
needs diﬀerences between income units, expressing, e.g., that (for each income level) a
couple needs m t i m e st h ei n c o m eo fas i n g l et or e a c ht h es a m el i v i n gs t a n d a r d s ,w i t hm
between 1 and 2. Equivalence scales are deﬁned with respect to a reference type, usually
as i n g l e .O n c ed e ﬁned, practitioners can (i) transform the heterogeneous distribution of
incomes and types into a homogeneous distribution of equivalent incomes (for reference
types) and (ii) use a standard tool (an index or dominance criterion) applied to the
vector of equivalent incomes. Depending on the chosen tool, we call it either a cardinal
index or a cardinal dominance approach.1
Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) consider a dominance criterion which is inter-
mediate between the ordinal and the cardinal approach. They propose to make welfare
comparisons using the GLD criterion for a bounded set of equivalence scale vectors.
Choosing the bounded set as small as possible, their criterion reduces to Ebert’s (1999)
cardinal GLD approach –the GLD criterion applied to household incomes, both divided
and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale– and choosing the bounded set as wide
as possible, their criterion is equivalent with one of Bourguignon’s (1989) dominance
criteria.
The diﬀerent existing ways to deal with heterogeneity, as well as the main contributions,
1As noted by Pyatt (1990) and Glewwe (1991), the use of an equivalence scale may give rise to
a weighting problem. More precisely, it is not clear whether one should weight each income unit by
the number of individuals or by the equivalence scale; see Ebert (1997), Ebert and Moyes (2003) and
Shorrocks (2005), and Capéau and Ooghe (2004) for a possible solution.
2are summarized in table 1. The rows denote the diﬀerent ways to measure the well-being
of heterogeneous income units: do we use one speciﬁc equivalence scale (cardinal), a
bounded set of equivalence scales (intermediate) or no scales at all, which is equivalent
to a “wide” set of scales (ordinal)? The columns summarize the diﬀerent ways to
aggregate the resulting well-beings: do we use an index or a dominance criterion, e.g.,
the GLD criterion? Moving downwards (resp. rightwards) in table 1 increases robustness
as we consider more equivalence scales (resp. indices), at the cost of completeness, i.e.,



















































Table 1: A classiﬁcation of the diﬀerent ways to deal with heterogeneity.
In this paper, we explore the shaded area in table 1. In the next section, we introduce
Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) bounded dominance test and propose an alternative bounded
index test, based on a speciﬁc iso-elastic measure (area A in table 1). Using the same
bounds, the bounded index test is less robust, but more powerful compared to Fleurbaey
et al.’s (2003) bounded dominance test. Choosing bounds as small as possible in the
bounded index test, we get a cardinal index test in line with Ebert’s (1997) weighting
scheme: an index applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the
(unique) equivalence scale. Choosing bounds as wide as possible, we obtain a (new)
sequential index test (area B in table 1), i.e., checking –on the basis of the iso-elastic
index– whether welfare is higher for the most needy income units only, for the most
and second most needy only, and so on.
We illustrate the bounded dominance and the bounded index test by measuring welfare
changes in Russia from 1994 to 2002 on the basis of the RLMS (Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey) data. The post-communist era (after 1991) was characterized by
rising inequality and strongly decreasing GDP per capita, reaching rock bottom with the
ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998. Afterwards, enhanced political stability and increasing
3oil prices led to strong growth and slowly decreasing inequality. Therefore, we expect
welfare to decrease in the ﬁrst and to rise again in the second period. While the bounded
index test is able to detect such a pattern, this is not the case for the bounded dominance
test. Robustness with respect to the aggregation of well-beings, rather than with respect
to its measurement, turns out to be the main culprit.
2 Robust welfare comparisons
2.1 Notation
Consider household incomes y ∈ R+ and types k ∈ K = {1,...,K} representing relevant
non-income characteristics; types are ordered from least (k =1 )t om o s tn e e d y( k = K).
A heterogeneous distribution is denoted by F =( p1,...,p K,F 1,...,F K),w i t hpk the
proportion of households with type k and Fk the (diﬀerentiable) income distribution
function of type k households deﬁned over R+ with a ﬁnite support [0,sk].W e f o c u s
directly on the case where demographics might change, or the proportions pk may vary
over the diﬀerent distributions. Household utility functions Uk : R+ → R measure the
utility of a household with type k as a function of its income, with Uk (0) ﬁnite for all
k ∈ K. Social welfare in a distribution F is measured by the average household utility
in society:







2.2 A bounded dominance test
Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (FHT in the sequel) consider a lower and upper bound
vector α,β ∈ RK which satisfy
(1,1,...,1) ≤ (α1 =1 ,α2,...,αK) ≤ (β1 =1 ,β2,...,βK). (2)
Type 1 (the least needy type) will be referred to as the reference type. They impose the
following conditions on household utility functions, all assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable (a brief explanation follows; note already that the last condition depends
on an exogeneous income level a1 ∈ R+).
A1: U
 
k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ K,
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1 (a1) for all k =2 ,...,K
.
The marginal utility of a type is its social priority, because it tells a utilitarian social
planner where to put his money ﬁrst when maximizing social welfare. Assumptions A1
and A2 are standard: all types have positive, but decreasing, social priority. In terms of
money transfers, these conditions require that more income is better (Pareto principle)
and transfers from rich to poor households of t h es a m et y p ei m p r o v es o c i a lw e l f a r e( t h e
within type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle).
Assumption A3 and A4 link the social priority of the diﬀerent types. Therefore, they
also tell us something about the welfare eﬀect of money transfers between types, because
a small money transfer from a type with a lower to a type with a higher social priority,
































Figure 1: Partial comparability in case of bounded equivalence scales.
Figure 1 illustrates the social priority classiﬁcation of two households with adjacent
types k − 1 and k, depending on their household incomes yk−1 and yk. For all income
combinations in zone (X), type k has a higher social priority than type k −1,a n dv i c e -
versa in zone (Z). In the area (Y), there is disagreement whether type k or k − 1 has
the highest social priority. Notice that the disagreement zone dissapears when choosing
αk = βk, while it increases when lowering αk and/or increasing βk. Ebert (1999) and
Bourguignon (1989) correspond with the limiting cases in which (for all k =2 ,...,K)
either αk = βk,o rαk =1and βk →∞ .
Finally, assumption A5 depends on an exogeneous income level a1 and is imposed to
deal with changing demographics. At a certain income level, social welfare is invariant
to transfers of population across need groups (A5a) and transfers of income across need
groups (A5b).
5We denote with U (α,β,a 1) the family of utility proﬁles (U1,...,U K) satisfying assump-
tions A1-A5, given α,β,a 1. We say that a distribution F welfare dominates G according
to the family U (α,β,a 1), denoted F (α,β,a1) G, if and only if the welfare diﬀerence
∆W = W (F)−W (G) is positive for all proﬁles in U (α,β,a 1). The following proposi-
tion shows how welfare dominance for (α,β,a1) can be implemented. Deﬁne functions
H1
k and H2
k over R+ (for all types k ∈ K)a s :
H1





k (x)dx.( 3 )
FHT (2003) prove the following result:
Fohxuedh|,H djqhuì dqg Tudqqr| (2003). Consider two heterogeneous distribu-








lower and upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK which satisfy (2). Let ZK+1 : x  → 0.D e -
ﬁne functions Zk recursively (starting from k = K downwards to k =2 )a sZk :







F (α,β,a1) G ⇔ H2
1 (y)+Z2 (y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ [0,a1]. (4)
Note that the implementation of the FHT-criterion is far from trivial, due to the calcu-
lation of the maximum functions. In the next section, we present a simpler and more
powerful, but less robust criterion.
2.3 A bounded index test
We deﬁne an iso-elastic household utility function I, which is reminiscent of Clark,
Hemming, and Ulph’s (1981) poverty index:










,f o ry ≤ a1
0,f o ry>a 1
, (5)
with a1 ∈ R+ an exogeneous income level, ρ the inequality aversion parameter, with
ρ ≥ 0,ρ  =1 ,2 and m an equivalence scale. We brieﬂye x p l a i nt h ed i ﬀerent parameters.
The term a1 is only introduced to ensure that the iso-elastic household utility proﬁles
(see below) become a subset of Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) proﬁles. To put it diﬀerently,
the term a1 ensures that condition A5 will be satisﬁed. But, one could also leave out the
term a1 to obtain a more standard Kolm-Atkinson-Sen welfare index. The inequality
2In case ρ =1 , the usual logarithmic case applies, i.e.,
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.
6aversion parameter is related to the cost of inequality: the higher this parameter, the
more of the average one is willing to give up for an equal society. The equivalence
scale m will be used to diﬀerentiate the household utility functions according to needs.
More precisely, to satisfy conditions A3 and A4, we consider equivalence scale vectors
m =( m1,...,m K) –consisting of one equivalence scale for each household type–
which belong to the following bounded set
M(α,β)=
 
m ∈ RK | m1 =1and αkmk−1 ≤ mk ≤ βkmk−1 for all k =2 ,...,K
 
.
Choosing αk =1and βk →∞ , for all k =2 ,...,K, M(α,β) contains all equivalence
scales satisfying m1 =1≤ m2 ≤ ... ≤ mK;C h o o s i n gαk = βk, for all k =2 ,...,K,
is choosing one speciﬁc equivalence scale vector m equal to α (and β). We denote
with I (α,β,a 1,ρ) the family of iso-elastic utility proﬁles (I (·,m 1),...,I(·,m K)),o n e
for each vector m in M(α,β),a n d(α,β,a1,ρ) is the corresponding unanimity quasi-
ordering. We obtain:3
Pursrvlwlrq 1. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G, an exogeneous
income level a1 ≥ max(s1,s2,...,sK), lower and upper bound vectors α,β ∈ RK which
satisfy (2) and an inequality aversion parameter ρ ≥ 0.L e tZ◦











k (y) as bk. Deﬁne functions Z◦
k recursively (starting from
k = K downwards to k =3 ) as Z◦







F (α,β,a1,ρ) G if and only if b1 + b2mρ + Z◦
3 (m) ≥ 0for all m ∈ [α2,β2]. (6)
Notice that the functions Z◦
k for k =3 ,...,Kcan be easily calculated, because monotonic-
ity guarantees that the minimum can be found at one of the extremes. Furthermore, the
bounded dominance and bounded index criteria are nested, i.e., F (α,β,a1) G implies
F (α,β,a1,ρ) G, for all ρ ∈ R+.4 Finally, choosing α = β, we obtain Ebert’s cardinal
approach for indices, i.e., apply an index to household incomes, divided and weighted by
the equivalence scale. Choosing αk =1and βk →∞ , for all k ∈ K, our next proposition
tells us that (α,β,a1,ρ) reduces to a (new) sequential indext e s ti nt h es p i r i to fA t k i n s o n
and Bourguignon (1987):
Pursrvlwlrq 2. Consider two heterogeneous distributions F and G, an exogeneous
income level a1 ≥ max(s1,s2,...,sK), lower and upper bound vectors α =( 1 ,...,1)
and β → (1,∞,...,∞) and an inequality aversion parameter ρ ≥ 0.D e ﬁne all bk’s as
3All proofs are in the appendix.
4The family I (α,β,a 1,ρ) is, strictly speaking, not a subset of U (α,β,a 1), because proﬁles in the
former family are not (twice continuously) diﬀerentiable at (a1,...,a 1). Still, both criteria are nested,
as we only integrate up to a1.
7in proposition 1. We have
F (α,β,a1,ρ) G if and only if
K  
k=i
bk ≥ 0 for all i =1 ,...,K. (7)
3 Welfare changes in Russia 1994-2002
We illustrate and compare the bounded dominance and the bounded index test by
measuring welfare changes in Russia from 1994 to 2002 on the basis of the RLMS
(Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey) data. But ﬁrst, we brieﬂy describe the data
and the Russian socio-economic background.
3.1 The data
The RLMS surveys starts in 1992 and describes in detail the living conditions, expen-
ditures and incomes, and socio-economic characteristics of a representative panel of
Russian households.5 They are conducted in two phases. The ﬁrst phase consists of
four rounds, covering 1992 and 1993, and might be considered more or less as a pilot
survey. The second phase starts with a new panel in 1994 (round 5) and continues until
today. We use the data of the second phase only, starting from Round 5 in 1994 up
to Round 11 in 2002. In each round, we use the appropriate sample weights, delivered
by the RLMS team, to gross up the sample to a nationally representative population of
Russian households.
To measure living standards of Russian households we use non durable expenditures
in constant prices. Since consumption can be considered as the “annuity value” of
permanent income (see Blundell and Preston (1998)), we choose expenditures instead
of income as an attempt to approximate permanent income. Moreover it is well known
that expenditures on durables and luxuries are a very poor measure of the services
enjoyed from the stock of durables. Therefore we have omitted durable expenditures.6
With the three-digit inﬂation ﬁgures of the beginning of the nineties, and a ﬁgure not
less than 15% in 2002, the conversion from nominal expenditures to expenditures in
constant prices is of course a crucial one. Fortunately, the RLMS datasets contain
expenditures both in current and in constant prices, where the RLMS researchers have
converted the nominal ones into constant prices of 1992 by means of region speciﬁc (but
not commodity speciﬁc) price indices. In the appendix, we sketch the evolution of the
5See the website http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms and Mroz et al. (2004) for detailed informa-
tion on this survey. The data can be freely downloaded.
6Another possibility would be to impute user costs for durables. But, based on experience with
Round 9, we are conﬁdent that the laborious exercise of imputation of user costs would produce little
or no diﬀerence for our analysis; see Decoster and Verbina (2003).
8proportion and the average real expenditures of diﬀerent needs groups in the Russian
population over the diﬀerent rounds.
3.2 The socio-economic background
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 was followed by a complete collapse of the
traditional economic structures, and led to repeated signiﬁcant declines in the real per
capita GDP. According to the World Development Indicators, real GDP per capita fell
by no less than 40% from 1990 to 1996 (World Bank (2004)). The biggest contractions
occurred in 1992 (-14.6%) and 1994 (-12.5%). And precisely at the moment when the
biggest collapse seemed to be over (in 1997 real GDP per capita increased by 1.7%),
the ﬁnancial crisis of August 1998 swept away the painfully built up savings of millions
of households. Starting the index of real GDP per capita at 100 in 1990, the trough of
58 was reached in 1998. From 1999 onwards, increased political stability and rising oil
prices pushed the Russian economy into a promising growth path again. Real GDP per
capita grew by 6.8, 10.6, 5.6 and 4.8% in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively, which,
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Figure 2: Evolution of real expenditures per capita (RLMS), GDP per capita and Gini (’94=100).
7Note that this spectacular collapse of GDP per capita is smoothed away to some extent when looking
at consumption per capita in the National Accounts. According to the World Development Indicators
in the World Bank report (2004), this aggregate only contracted from 100 in 1990 to a bottom of 87.6
in 1999. In 2002, the index of consumption per capita had already recovered up to 113.3.
9In ﬁgure 2, we show the evolution of some central concepts during the period under
consideration. We have expressed everything relative to 1994 by means of an index
taking the value of 100 in this year. The line which slopes sharply downwards represents
the average per capita real monthly expenditures in the RLMS dataset (equal to 2982
(old) Rubles in 1994). The dotted line with the triangles represents the evolution of
real monthly GDP per capita (equal to 8528 (old) Rubles in 1994). The U-shape,
with a recovery from 2000 onwards, is similar for both datasources, but much more
pronounced in the expenditure information from the RLMS-survey. This is in line with
recent ﬁndings in the debate on the evolution of world income inequality, where one
observes large discrepancies between the growth of consumption in the surveys and the
growth of either GDP or the consumption aggregate of GDP for many countries (see
Deaton (2001)). No satisfactory explanation has been given up to now for these large
diﬀerences.
The upper line with the squares shows the evolution of the Gini coeﬃcient, calculated
on the real per capita expenditures (equal to 41.3 in 1994). We observe a slight increase
from 1994 to 1996 (from 41.3 to 44.4), followed by a slowly declining pattern from
1996 onwards (the Gini falls from 44.4 back to 39.9). Our ﬁndings ﬁtw e l lw i t ht h e
extensive literature on the evolution of the Russian inequality. During the ﬁrst years
of the transition (from 1990 to 1995) there was an unprecendented rise in inequality,
well documented, e.g., in Kislytsina (2003) and in Yemtsov (2003). Both report the
oﬃcal Gini of Goskomstat, rising from 23.3 in 1990 to 40.9 in 1994. The ﬁrst rounds
of RLMS-data conﬁrm this picture: Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1999)
calculate an increase in the Gini of RLMS-incomes from 42.6 in 1992 to 45.3 in 1994.
Lokshin and Popkin (1999), also working with income data from RLMS, ﬁnd a more
moderate increase from 41 in 1992 to 43 in 1995, but a pronounced rise of the Gini up
to 49 in 1996. Hence, the fact that we ﬁnd the highest Gini in 1996, might ﬁtw i t ht h e s e
results. But for the second half of the nineties the picture diﬀers, depending on whether
or not one uses the Goskomstat data. Kislytsina (2003), working with both sources,
ﬁnds moderately increasing inequality with Goskomstat data (from 37.5 in 1996 to 40
in 2001), but clearly declining inequality in the RLMS data, independent of whether she
works with income or expenditures.8 Our declining Gini from 1996 onwards corresponds
very well with her results.
It is striking that the extensive literature on the inequality evolution in Russia during
the transition did not pay any attention to the issue of equivalence scales. Most authors
seem to take for granted that the most sensible choice is to work with per capita con-
8Galbraith, Krytynskaia and Wang (2004) sketch a very deviating picture of sharply increasing
inequality since 1997. They use Goskomstat aggregate data.
10cepts.9 Yet, preliminary results on the RLMS data do show a sensitivity to the scale.
If we calculate the Gini coeﬃcient for a continuum of equivalence scales, deﬁned by the
number of persons to the power θ,w h e r eθ varies from 0 to 1, and we then rank the
years from lowest to highest Gini of equivalent income, the ranking is not robust. The
year 1995, e.g., has the lowest Gini when calculated on household expenditures (θ =0 ),
but only the fourth lowest Gini when calculated on per capita values (θ =1 ). There
are corresponding rank reversals for other years. Hence some analysis of the robustness
of the results for diﬀerent equivalence scales seems appropriate here.
Equally surprising is the lack of a robust analysis with respect to the choice of the
inequality measure and its underlying normative assumptions. As usual, the majority
of the papers uses the Gini coeﬃcient to investigate inequality changes. Yet, the reported
ﬁndings do not seem to be robust to this choice either. In Commander, Tolstopiatenko
and Yemtsov (1999), e.g., inequality increases between 1992 and 1996 when judged by
means of the Gini or the bottom sensitive Theils. But when inequality is measured
by means of the top sensitive Theil, ordinally equivalent to the coeﬃcient of variation,
inequality unambiguously decreases over the same period. More robust methods, like
the ones discussed above, are deﬁnitely appropriate.
3.3 Empirical illustration
Contrary to the existing empirical literature, we focus on welfare rather than inequality
rankings. On the one hand, we are prepared to accept at least some partiality of the
ranking of the diﬀerent years, due to the required robustness. On the other hand, ﬁgure
2 gives a clear (but non-robust) picture of welfare changes in Russia. Given a steeply
decreasing average and a slightly increasing inequality in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ep e r i o d ,
and the reverse in the second half of the period, welfare should go down in the ﬁrst and
catch up again in the second period. At least, we expect a reasonably robust welfare
measure to detect parts of this U-pattern.
We use household size to divide households in 7 diﬀerent needs groups, ranging from
1 to 7+ (7 or more individuals). We choose the lower bounds equal to unity: larger
households need more household income compared to smaller ones to reach the same
living standards, or α =( 1 ,1,...,1). For the upper bounds, we ensure that the scale
itself is bounded by the number of persons in the household: in terms of per capita
income, larger households need less per capita income compared to smaller ones to







. Furthermore, we set a1 equal
9Exceptions are Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov (1999), and Förster, Jesuit and Smeeding
(2002). The former show graphs of the evolution of the Gini for diﬀerent equivalence scales. But,
although they ﬁnd some rank reversals, they do not discuss this sensitivity. The latter use the square
root of household size as the equivalence scale.
11to the maximal household income over the diﬀerent rounds.10 Table 2 summarizes
our results for the bounded index test, for diﬀerent values of the inequality aversion
parameter ρ. In the last column, we encircle the dominances which are also found by
the FHT-criterion (for the same bounds α,β and the same a1).
94 was better (+)o rw o r s e( −)c o m p a r e dt oy e a r( i nr o w s )u s i n gρ (in columns)


















98 was better (+)o rw o r s e( −)c o m p a r e dt oy e a r( i nr o w s )u s i n gρ (in columns)
00 −−−−−−− − 
01 −−−−−−− − 
02 −−−−−−− − 
00 was better (+)o rw o r s e( −)c o m p a r e dt oy e a r( i nr o w s )u s i n gρ (in columns)
01 −−−−
02 −−−−−−
01 was better (+)o rw o r s e( −)c o m p a r e dt oy e a r( i nr o w s )u s i n gρ (in columns)
02 + −−−−− −
total 18/21 18/21 20/21 20/21 19/21 17/21 15/21 15/21 8/21
Table 2: Dominance results for the bounded index test.
The total number of rankings (in the last row) obviously depends on the choice of the
10Choosing higher values –smaller values are not allowed– decreases the number of successful rank-
ings for both the FHT-criterion and the bounded index test (especially if inequality aversion is low).
12parameter ρ. But for a wide range of ρ-values from 0.20 to 10, the number of dominances
ranges from a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 20 (out of 21 possible comparisons). It is
clear that the serious decline in social welfare in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ep e r i o d ,f o l l o w e db y
a recovery afterwards, is detected properly. In contrast, the performance of the FHT-
criterion is disappointing: only 3 out of 21 comparisons can be ranked unambiguously:
1998 is dominated by 2000, 2001 and 2002.11 It is quite striking that it cannot identify
the steep fall in average per capita expenditures up to 1998 in combination with a
slightly increasing inequality as a social welfare loss. Let us try to ﬁnd out why this is
the case.
Recall table 1, which classiﬁes the diﬀerent ways to deal with heterogeneous welfare
comparisons. In table 3, we list the number of dominances (on a total of 21 bilateral











Table 3: The number of dominances for the diﬀerent criteria.
While the bounded index test ﬁnds between 15 and 20 dominances –depending on the
inequality aversion parameter– the FHT-criterion only detects three dominances. If








(obviously) get a complete ranking (21 dominances) for the bounded index test and (still)
3 dominances for the FHT-criterion. This points to the fact that the lack of ranking
power of the FHT-criterion is not caused by the robustness with respect to the needs
speciﬁcation, but to the robustness with respect to the concavity of the welfare function.
If we move downwards –keeping α =( 1 ,...,1) and letting β → (1,∞,...,∞)–w e
ﬁnd in between 1 and 11 dominances, using the sequential index test (proposition 2). For
example, considering moderate values of ρ equal to 1.5 and 2, we can make 11 bilateral
comparisons each. This is in sharp contrast with the the zero score of the ordinal
dominance criteria (Bourguignon’s dominance criterion and the SGLD criterion) in the
lower-right corner.








for some n, typically adds two dominances (even for large values of n): 2000 is dominated by 2001 and
2002.
134C o n c l u s i o n
Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) introduce a criterion to measure welfare in a
robust way, i.e., robust with respect to both the needs speciﬁcation (via a bounded set of
equivalence scales) and the aggregation procedure (via the generalized Lorenz dominance
(GLD) criterion). Choosing the bounded set of equivalence scales as small as possible,
their criterion reduces to Ebert’s (1999) cardinal GLD approach, i.e., the GLD criterion
applied to household incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence
scale. Choosing the bounded set as wide as possible, their criterion is equivalent with
one of Bourguignon’s (1989) dominance criteria.
We propose a bounded (iso-elastic) index test to make welfare comparisons which are
robust with respect to the needs speciﬁcation, but depend on the chosen inequality
aversion parameter. Choosing the bounded set as small as possible, we get a cardinal
index test in line with Ebert’s (1997) weighting scheme: an index applied to household
incomes, both divided and weighted by the (unique) equivalence scale. Choosing bounds
as wide as possible, we obtain a (new) sequential index test, i.e., checking –on the basis
of the iso-elastic index– whether welfare is higher for the most needy income units only,
for the most and second most needy only, and so on.
In comparison with Fleurbaey et al.’s (2003) bounded dominance criterion, our cri-
terion is simple, more complete, but less robust. To illustrate the trade-oﬀ between
completeness and robustness, we compare the ranking power of the bounded dominance
and the bounded index test using the Russian RLMS (Russian Longitudinal Monitor-
ing Survey) data between 1994 and 2002. The cost of robustness with respect to the
well-being aggregation turns out to be high. Contrary to the bounded index test, the
bounded dominance criterion can hardly detect welfare changes in Russia, in spite of
the increasing inequality and strongly declining GDP per capita in the period before
the ﬁnancial crisis (1994-1998), and the opposite afterwards (1998-2002). Furthermore,
their criterion performs equally badly when using household size as the sole equivalence
scale, which indicates that using generalized Lorenz dominance is the main culprit.
Therefore we think that it might be worthwile to use the bounded index test for some
selected inequality aversion parameters to make welfare comparisons, without giving up
the robustness with respect to the needs speciﬁcation.
14P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1
We focus on the case ρ  =1 ; the other case ρ =1is analogous. By deﬁnition of the







k (y) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M(α,β). (8)
Because (for all k ∈ K)( i )a1 ≥ sk and (ii) the function dH1
k is zero outside its support,















































k (y) for all k =1 ,...,K.




ρ ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M(α,β). (9)
Let Z◦
K+1 : x  → 0.D e ﬁne functions Z◦
k recursively (starting from k = K downwards to




































K−1 (mK−2) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M(α,β)
⇔ ...
⇔ b1 + b2 (m2)
ρ + Z◦
3 (m2) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ M(α,β)
⇔ b1 + b2 (m2)
ρ + Z◦
3 (m2) ≥ 0 for all α2 ≤ m2 ≤ β2, as required.
15P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
Again, we focus on the case ρ  =1 ; the other case is analogous. Recall equation (9)
and the deﬁnition of M(α,β).C h o o s i n gα =( 1 ,...,1) and β → (∞,...,∞),w eh a v e


















k (y) for all k =1 ,...,K.
We show that equation (10) is equivalent with
K  
k=i
bk ≥ 0 for all i =1 ,...,K. (11)
Suﬃciency. Suppose (11) holds; thus, choosing i =1 ,w em u s th a v eb1 +
 K
k=2 bk ≥ 0.
Since (m2)
ρ ≥ 1, for all m2 ≥ 1,a n d
 K





bk ≥ 0, for all m2 ≥ 1,
b1 +( m2)




bk ≥ 0, for all m2 ≥ 1.
Since (m3)
ρ ≥ (m2)
ρ, for all m3 ≥ m2 and
 K
k=3 bk ≥ 0 (from (11) for i =3 )w em u s t
have
b1 +( m2)













bk ≥ 0, for all m3 ≥ m2 ≥ 1.





ρ ≥ 0, for all mK ≥ mK−1 ≥ ...≥ m2 ≥ 1, as required.




bk < 0. (12)
161. First, suppose j =1 . As (10) holds, we might choose an equivalence scale vector
m =( 1 ,...,1),a n dw eo b t a i n
K  
k=1
bk ≥ 0,( 1 3 )
which contradicts equation (12) for j =1 .
2. Suppose 1 <j≤ K. Equation (12) and (13) together, we must have
j−1  
k=1
bk > 0.( 1 4 )
Choose an equivalence scale vector m with 1=m1 = ... = mj−1 ≤ mj = ... = mK = η








which cannot be true for all values of η ≥ 1, given equations (12) and (14).
17Some summary statistics for the RLMS
In the next table we present (i) the proportions (denoted by p) and (ii) the average real
expenditures in Rubles of 1992 (denoted by y) of the households in the diﬀerent need
groups (based on household size) over the diﬀerent RLMS-rounds.
household size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+
p 17.62 8 .62 3 .12 1 .06 .31 .91 .5
Round 5 (1994)
y 3641 7585 9174 11029 11649 10431 16007
p 18.8 27.9 22.8 20.5 6.7 1.9 1.4
Round 6 (1995)
y 3546 6750 7842 9121 10367 11700 11295
p 19.3 27.8 22.6 20.3 6.4 2.4 1.2
Round 7 (1996)
y 2990 5611 7174 8139 9811 9274 13225
p 19.6 28.1 22.6 20.0 6.1 2.1 1.5
Round 8 (1998)
y 2225 3980 5233 6417 7369 7447 9959
p 20.3 27.9 22.1 19.9 6.1 2.3 1.4
Round 9 (2000)
y 2367 4351 6378 7644 8105 9072 12767
p 21.5 27.8 21.6 19.5 6.2 1.8 1.6
Round 10 (2001)
y 2698 4982 6703 8509 9253 11448 13693
p 21.1 27.7 21.9 19.6 6.2 2.0 1.5
Round 11 (2002)
y 2772 4900 7483 8784 9147 9459 12471
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